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1. INTRODUCTION 
As incomes increase around the world, people will demand more efficient, cleaner, and less 
obtrusive energy services. That is the central message of the three cases, subdivided into 
six scenarios, that are presented in the full report of the joint IIASA and WEC study Global 
Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond (1). The scenarios cover a wide range of global energy 
developments -from a tremendczs expansion of coal production to strict limits, from a phaseaut 
of nuclear energy to a substantial increase, from carbon emissions in 2 100 that are only one- 
third of today's levels to increases by more than a factor of three. Yet, for all the variation they 
explore among alternative energy systems, all manage to match the likely, continuing push by 
consumers for more flexible, more convenient, cleaner forms of energy. This report summarizes 
the financing requirements of the energy sector needed to achieve these goals, with a particular 
emphasis on investments in the developing regions. 
Capital requirements are assessed according to traditional definitions of energy investments. 
They include capital for energy production capacities, for conversion and transformation facil- 
ities, for transmission and distribution infrastructures, and for complying with environmental 
standards. Capital requirements for energy end-use devices are not included in this assessment. 
(Traditionally they are excluded from energy-sector capital requirements and are counted as 
durable consumer goods and business investments.) The range of the cumulative capital re- 
quirements from 1990 to 2020, across the cases, is measured from US(1990)$13 to 20 trillion 
(10'~) .  This is to be compared with the gross world economic product (GWP) of US$21 trillion 
( lot2)  in 1990. Although both this range and magnitude of capital requirements are enormous, 
they are less intimidating when viewed in the context of economic growth, investment, savings, 
GWP and the size of capital markets implied by the scenarios. Capital requirements grow 
substantially, but more slowly than GWP. This is true in all scenarios, but it does not imply that 
these capital requirements can actually be raised on domestic and international capital markets 
for energy investments. 
The three cases, subdivided into six scenarios, build on the analysis of the WEC Commission 
Report Lnergy for Tomorrow's World (2). 'I'he development paths. of the six scenarios vary 
through 2020, but after 2020, they start to diverge. Part of that divergence will depend on 
policy choices and development strategies. For example, two scenarios that assume aggressive 
international cooperation focused on environmental protection and international equity, lead to 
less fossil fuel use than the other scenarios. Most of the post-2020 divergence will depend on 
technological developments and economic restructuring. Which energy sources in 2020 will be 
'An earlier version of this paper was published as asupport paper for the Session on "Rural Energy Development 
and Energy Financing in Developing Countries" at the 16th World Energy Council (WEC) Tokyo Congress held 
on 8-13 October 1995. 
better matched to the more flexible, more convenient, and cleaner forms of energy desired by 
the consumer? Which will have made the investments in research and development that will 
give them a technological edge? Which will have shifted their businesses away from providing 
just tons of coal or kilowatt-hours of electricity toward also providing more flexible, convenient, 
and clean energy services to consumers? 
The answers to those questions will be determined between now and 2020. Because of the 
long lifetimes of power plants, refineries, and other energy investments, there is not a sufficient 
turnover of such facilities to reveal large divergence across our scenarios prior to 2020, but 
the seeds of the post-2020 world will have been so\Vil by then. The choice of the world's 
post-2020 energy systems is wide open now. It will be much narrower by 2020. Today's energy 
investments, especially in the developing world, will shape future opportunities and financing 
possibilities. 
2. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF SCENARIOS 
As in Energy for Tomorrow's World (2), the joint IIASA and WEC study report Global Energy 
Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond (1) presents three sets of scenarios, Cases A, B, and C. 
It examines the possibilities beyond 2020 more thoroughly than could be done in Energy 
for Tonlorrow's World. The principal focus is on the period between 2020 and 2050, but some 
preliminary results are also presented up to 2 100. In brief, Case A presents a future of impressive 
technological improvements and high economic growth. Case B describes a future with less 
ambitious, though perhaps more realistic, technological improvements and, consequently, more 
intermediate economic growth. Case C presents a "rich ecologically driven" future. It includes 
both substantial technological progress and unprecedented international cooperation centered 
explicitly on environmental protection. 
The key characteristics of the three cases are summarized in Table I and short descriptions are 
given in the Appendix. The following paragraphs provide more detail on what they have in 
common and where they differ. 
2.1. COMMONALITIES AMONG SCENARIOS 
All three cases provide for significant social and economic development, particularly in the 
developing countries, and are therefore based on a substantial increase in financing require- 
ments. They lead to improved energy efficiencies and environmental compatibility, and thus for 
associated growth in both the quantity and quality of energy services. 
World population is expected to double to 10 billion (lo9) by 2050 and to increase to nearly 
12 billion (lo9) by 2100 (Figure I), while economic Iit.,;~elopment r ,r;tinues throughout the 
world. According to the scenarios of this study, the result is a three- to five-fold increase in 
world economic output by 2050 and a 10- to 15-fold increase by 2100. By 2 100, per capita 
income in most of the currently developing countries reaches and surpasses levels characteristic 
of the developed countries today, making current distinctions between the two obsolete. Primary 
energy consumption grows less than the global demand for energy services due to improvements 
in energy intensities. Figure I shows a one and a half- to three-fold increase in primary energy 
requirements across .the three cases by 2050, and a two- to five-fold increase by 2100, 
Table 1: A Summary for Three Cases in 2050 and 2100. 
Case 
High Growth Middle Course Ecologically Driven 
Population in lo9 
2050 10.1 10.1 10.1 
2100 11.7 11.7 11.7 
GWP in 1012 US(1990)$ 
2050 
2100 
Energy intensity improvement medium low 
PEIGDP, %/yr 
World (1 990-2050) -1 .O -0.7 
World (1 990-2 100) -1 .O -0.8 
Primary energy demand, Gtoe 
2050 25 
2100 45 
Resource availability 
Fossil 
Non-fossil 
Technology costs 
Fossil 
Non-fossil 
Technology dynamics 
Fossil 
Non-fossil 
high medium 
high medium 
low 
low 
medium 
medium 
high medium 
high medium 
C02 emission constraint no 
Carbon emissions, GtC 
2050 
2100 
high 
low 
high 
high 
low 
medium 
high 
Environmental taxes no no yes 
2.2. DISTINCTIONS AMONG SCENARIOS 
Where all six scenarios diverge is in the dynamics of energy system transformation as reflected 
in the contributions of individual primary energy sources - in other 'words what percentage is 
supplied by coal, what percentage by oil, and so forth. That divergence is shown in Table 2, 
which summarizes key numerical characteristics for all six scenarios. It presents a snapshot of 
how the scenarios would look in 2050. 
Figure 2 presents the development over time of the structure of primary energy shares in 
Case B. Other cases and their underlying scenarios portray different dynamics of future changes 
in energy sources and in the structure of the energy system. However, the overall characteristic 
is a continuous shift from fossil to other sources of energy and toward higher quality, more 
flexible, and cleaner forms of energy delivered to the final consumer. 
Assumptions on the most salient forces driving and shaping future energy systems are varied 
across the scenarios in order to explore both differences and commonalities of alternative future 
I World population I 
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Figure 1: Global Primary Energy Use (Gtoe), 1850 to Present, and in the Three Cases to 2100. 
The insert shows global population growth, 1850 to present, and its projection (3) to 2100, in 
billions (lo9) of people. 
primary and final energy structures. The scenarios vary with respect to future technologies in 
terms of penetration rates, performance, and costs; with respect to the availability of energy 
sources, a question also closely related to technology; and with respect to geopolitical and policy 
issues, such as trade, technology transfer, environmental regulation, and energy deregulation. 
The high-growth Case A consists of three scenarios (Al, A2, A3); Case B, a single scenario; 
and the ecologically driven Case C, two scenarios (C1 and C2). This reflects the possibility 
of alternative development strategies with comparable levels of affluence and energy use. The 
three-pronged unfolding of Case A indicates that high levels of energy demand could be supplied 
by three fundamentally different strategies that diverge from each other over time. In Case C 
the differences between the two alternatives considered are less dramatic. For the intermediate 
Case B a single scenario was developed. In general, this scenario is associated with more modest, 
perhaps also rilere realistic, changes; therefore it did not seem useful to consider more extreme 
alternatives for the development of the energy system. Energy sector investment requirements 
are given with the greatest degree of detail for Case B, because it is less extreme than the other 
alternatives and because it illustrates the "middle course" of future financing requirements. 
2.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCING REQUIREMENTS 
After having presented the cases and how they unfold into six energy system scenarios we 
now turn to their implications for investment and financing. All three cases reflect substantial 
Table 2: Characteristics of Three Cases, Subdivided into Six Scenarios, for the World in 2050. 
Case 
A B C 
- 
- -. 
A1 A2 A3 C 1 C2 
Final energy, in Gtoe 17 17 17 14 10 10 
Final energy mix, % 
Solids 16 19 18 23 19 20 
Liquids 42 36 33 33 34 34 
Electricity 17 18 18 16 18 17 
Othera 25 27 3 1 28 29 29 
Primary energy, in Gtoe 25 25 25 20 14 14 
Primary energy mix, % 
Coal 24 32 9 2 1 11 10 
Oil 30 19 18 20 19 18 
Gas 24 22 32 23 27 24 
Nuclear 6 4 11 14 4 12 
Renewables 16 2 3 3 0 22 39 36 
Resource use 1990-2050, in Gtoe 
Coal 235 3 24 180 226 143 141 
Oil 323 302 284 257 210 210 
Gas 24 1 247 285 227 210 197 
Energy sector investment US$ 1012 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.7 
US$/toe supplied 50 67 47 56 50 50 
as % of GWP 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.5 0.9 0.9 
Emissions 
~ u l f u r ~ ~ " ,  MtS 
Nitrogenc, MtN 
Carbon, GtC 
"District heat, gas, and hydrogen. 
bunabated sulfur emissions in Case A could be three ( A l )  to five (A2) times higher leading to unacceptable local 
and regional environmental impacts. 
'Preliminary global estimates. 
growth for all energy industries to at least 2020, and profound changes beyond, leading to 
an enormous range and magnitude of capital requirements. The coming decades will bring 
nurnzrous changes within and between energy sectors. Many new business opportunities will 
arise linked to cleaner and more convenient fuels, to liquid rather than solid fuels, to grid and 
other interconnected supplies, and to more locally appropriate - often small-scale - energy 
sources and convc-rsion technologies. However, the cases indicate prospects will diverge 'fter 
2020, with energy industries and consumer needs embarking on mutually exclusive development 
paths across the six scenarios. All of these developments would have profound implications for 
future financing requirements. This is reflected in the range of cumulative capital requirements 
to 2020 - US(1990)$13 to 20 trillion ( loi2)  across the six scenarios. 
Despite its huge resource base, coal could be particularly vulnerable due to increased compe- 
tition from other energy sources and environmental constraints in response to sulfur dioxide, 
particulate, methane, and carbon dioxide ernissions. By contrast the oil industry, and the natural 
gas industry to an even greater extent, have a long future ahead. The prospects of natural gas 
Case B 
Figure 2: Evolution of Primary Energy Shares, 1850 to 2100, for Case B. 
will, however, have to be enhanced by aggressive exploration and resource development. New 
markets will have to be developed for the traditional fuels, with the recognition that the shift 
from just selling primary or final energy to marketing energy services will continue and intensify. 
In all scenarios renewable energy sources undergo significant expansion. Despite a slower start 
than depicted in other studies, the outlook given here is clearly bullish in the long run, a view 
also taken in the WEC's New Renewable Energy Resources: A Guide to the Future (4). The 
development and diffusion of new renewables are seen as requiring several OECD countries to 
take leading roles with subsequent large technology transfers to developing countries. In the 
long run the biggest market for renewables will be in the South. 
For nuclear power, prospects beyond 2020 are more uncertain. The potential for nuclear energy 
to make a substantial contribution will depend on whether public concerns about operational 
safety, waste disposal, and proliferation can be alleviated. If these concerns persist nuclear power 
could wither away, however it may be successfully challenged to introduce a new generation of 
facilities that are more acceptable. 
Technological progress and appropriate investment to match energy sources to the desire for more 
flexible, convenient and clean forms of energy required to service consumer needs are crucial, 
but several decades of turnover of capital stock will be required to achieve that match. In the 
meantime, unless the long-term goal is itself matched by the appropriate policies and investment 
decisions, it will become even harder and more costly to change course. lnvestment decisions to 
2020 are, therefore, an important concern - and not simply because of the tremendous sums of 
money involved. Work also needs to be done to extend the analysis beyond final energy to cover 
energy services and to examine what new institutional mechanisms are required to facilitate 
energy financing and the implementation of environmental policies attracting ever-widening 
support. 
We believe this study has identified patterns that are robust across a purposely broad range of 
scenarios. They can never turn an uncertain future into a sure thing, but they can delimit future 
energy financing requirements consistent with the range of scenarios. 
3. INVESTMENTS AND FINANCING 
3.1. ENERGY CAPITAL MARKETS AND INVESTMENTS 
Although the capital requirements for all three cases are enormous, they are less intimidating 
when looked at in the context of economic growth, investment, savings, and the size of capital 
markets implied by the scenarios. The current average global investment rate is about 22 percent 
of GWP - 2 1 percent in the industrialized countries and 24 percent in the developing countries. 
In the reforming economies, recent gross domestic product (GDP) declines have been matched 
by reduced savings, keeping the investment rate relatively constant at about 20 percent (5). 
Although energy investments as a share of economic product and total investments vary greatly 
among countries and between different stages of economic development, on average, between 
three to four percent of GDP is invested in the energy sector, and this ratio is expected to remain 
relatively stable (6). Average ratios of energy to total investments are also quite stable at about 
20 percent: approximately 10 percent for power sector investments, and five to 10 percent for 
upstream operations in the coal, oil, and gas sectors. Deviations from these averages can be 
as high as a factor of two to t h r ~ :  over the next decades. Large energy exporters or rapidly 
developing countries, for example, experience higher rates. 
Capital markets have been growing faster than total GDP for quite some time. Present annual 
global energy investments amount to at least 10 percent of international credit financing, which 
is about US$3.6 trillion (1012) (7). With capital markets growing relative to GDP, and assuming 
relatively stable future energy investment ratios, capital market size appears not to be a limiting 
factor for energy sector finance. 
The real challenges in raising funds for energy investments are the perceived risks to investors 
and adequate rates of return. Returns in the energy sector do not always compare well with 
many private investment alternatives, not even with other infrastructure investments. Between 
1974 and 1992, for example, electricity projects supported by the World Bank realized average 
rates of return of I1 percent per year, while urban development and transport returns were 23 
and 21 percent, respectively (8). Also important is the allocation of funds within the energy 
sector. Rate of return considerations discriminate against smaller-scale, clean, and innovative 
energy supplies, and against investments in energy efficiency improvements. Market size and 
product mobility often favor investments in oil exploration over, for example, natural gas or 
energy conservation. 
Until now, in many countries much of the energy sector has been publicly owned, and in 
most developing countries substantial international funding has supplemented limited domestic 
capabilities. The share of private sector capital has usually been less than 20 percent. More 
recently, growing public and private debt in industrialized and developing countries alike has 
made energy sectoi unancing, with its long amortization periuds, more difficult. Privatization has 
become the accepted political remedy. A second development increasing the likely dependence 
of energy investments on private capital, is stagnation in international development finance, 
despite an increase in international credit financing from five percent of gross world product, 
or about US$175 billion (lo9) in 1973 to 17 percent, or about US$3.6 trillion (1012) in 1993 
(7). Although energy financing therefore must increasingly come from the private sector, 
government policies can make a difference by restructuring subsidies that reduce noncommercial 
investment risks consistent with long-term development targets, by encouraging energy prices 
that reflect real costs, and by maintaining a stable political climate that reduces investment risks 
and broadens access to international capital markets. Nonetheless, the bottom line for energy 
investments remains unchanged: returns must at least match opportunity costs. 
Table 3 quantifies the cumulative energy sector capital requirements for Cases A, B, and C, 
according to traditional definitions of energy investments. They include capital for energy 
production capacities, for conversion and transformation facilities, for transmission and distri- 
bution infrastructures, and for complying with environmental standards. They do not include 
investments in end-use technologies such as furnaces, appliances, and vehicles, because they are 
traditionally counted as durable consumer goods or business investments. However, the fact that 
the performance of end-use technologies plays such an important role in all three cases in this 
study is a strong argument in favor of new approaches to evaluating energy sector investments. 
Integrated resource planning, for example, has begun to extend the traditional energy sector 
perspective to include investments in end-use technologies. Approaches that assess both supply 
options and end-use options, and both expansion and conservation will be increasingly essential 
in all the futures represented by the three cases. 
A simple "back of the envelope" calculation can be used to illustrate the need to widen the 
definition of energy investments to the whole energy system including end use. Case C relies 
heavily on measures to improve end-use efficiencies. For the period 2020 to 2050, Table 3 
shows cumulative investments in Case C to be only slightly more than half of the investments 
in Case A. Compared with Case B, Case C has the same GWP, but the traditional energy 
investments are US$400 billion (lo9) less, or only 64 percent of the investments in Case B. 
This looks almost like a "free lunch." This picture may change drastically if investments in 
end-use technologies are included. Case C uses 4 Gtoe less final energy or 6 Gtoe less primary 
energy than does Case B (see Table 2). Assume that this reduction is achieved with additional 
investments for more efficient end-use equipment and devices at levelized investment costs 
comparable to average energy sector investment needs. For example, an average investment of 
US$5O/toe (see Tables 2 and 3) would lead to total additional end-use capital requirements of 
US$300 billion (lo9) by 2020 for a reduction in primal) energy needs of 5 Gtoe. This simple 
calculation suggests that the total investments in the energy system for Case C could be of the 
same magnitude as for Case B. However, should end-use investments turn out to be higher or 
lower than assumed in this overly simplistic calculation, the relative attributions could change 
radically. 
3.2. INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Future specific investment costs, especially for new energy technologies, can depend on the 
cumulative learning effects. The three cases incorporate future technological improvements 
in performance and capital cost reductions with increasing diffusion, especially of new tech- 
nologies such i s  photovoltaics, llyclrngen production, or fuel cells. Capital costs of many 
conventional technologies also decline, albeit at a much slower rate due to the inherently incre- 
mental improvement of mature technologies. 
The full report of the joint IIASA and WEC study devotes considerable space to the dynamics of 
technological progress and to technological innovation and diffusion, drawing on the inventory 
of 1400 technologies (9,lO). We pooled all available estimates of investment requirements from 
the inventory so that the respective medians and ranges could be extracted from the data. For 
example, investment costs for solar systems and nuclear reactors were derived from 45 and 34 
Table 3: Cumulative Investments in Energy Sector by Region, 1990-2020 and 2020-2050, 
Case 
" d  
investments 1990-2020 2020-2050 1990-2020 2020-2050 1990-2020 2020-2050 
Cumulative 
in 1012 US$(1990) 
OECD 8 10 7 10 5 4 
REFS 3 6 2 5 2 3 
DCs 9 18 7 15 6 11 
World 20 34 16 30 13 18 
As share of GDP 
in percent 
OECD 
REFs 
DCs 
World 
Per unit of primary 
energy US$(1990)/toe 
OECD 50 49 5 1 60 46 42 
REFS 5 6 53 67 74 54 63 
DCs 44 49 40 5 1 42 48 
World 48 49 48 56 45 49 
'A1 scenario; 
b ~ l  scenario. 
- OECD: Countries members of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development; 
- REFs: Countries with reforming economies; 
- DCs: Developing countries. 
independent estimates, respectively, as shown in Figure 3. Near-term investment requirements 
assumed for the three cases were derived from the medians of the empirical cost distributions. 
Lower ranges defined the scope for future cost reductions along the learning curves that are 
realized at different rates in the three cases. 
The "learning" or "experience" curve characterizes the pattern of diminishing costs with increas- 
ing cumulative production. Its specific shape depends on the individual technology in question, 
but it is a persistent char.,-feristic of all successful, standardized technologies. Usually there are 
steep cost improvements during the research and development phase. For example, Figure 4 
shows an 18 percent reduction in investment costs per doubling of cumulative production of 
combustion turbines. These are followed by more modest i~q;r.ovements after commercializa 
tion - for combustion turbines, seven percent per production doubling. Improvements continue 
for some time at a slower pace and then cease as the technology approaches the end of its life 
cycle ( 13). 
Cases A, B, and C incorporate technological change through learning curve effects for various 
individual and generic technologies. These reflect different priorities and varying impacts 
of related features, such as international trade in some technologies and the scope for local 
dsvelopment and manufacture of others. 
600 1000 1400 1800 2200 2600 3000 3400 3800 4200 
I nves tmen t  c o s t  US(1990)$/kW 
Figure 3: Range of Investment Cost Distributions as a Histogram Used to Assess Current and 
Future Financing Requirements (n=number denotes the sample size). 
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Figure 4: Technology Learning Curves. Improvement in the costs per unit of capacity versus 
cumulative installed capacity. Sources: Adapted from MacGregor et al., (1 1); and Christiansson, 
(1 2). 
In Case A there is substantial advancement of all new, and currently marginal, energy pro- 
duction and conversion technologies. These advances are demonstrated across the board: for 
hydrocarbon exploration and extraction; for nuclear electricity generation and hydrogen; and for 
renewable sources of electricity generation and biofuel production and conversion. In Case B the 
advances are less substantial than in Case A, reflecting less concentrated research, development 
and diffusion efforts. In this respect Case B lags behind Case A by 30 percent. The bulk of the 
effort in Case B is put into incremental improvement of existing technologies consistent with 
the case's less concerted research and development efforts. For Case C, learning curve effects 
by design favor low-carbon fossil and renewable technologies. These technologies benefit from 
improvements equal to those in Case A. All other technologies develop as in Case B. 
Technological change leads to capital cost reductions in all cases with increasing scale of new 
technology deployment. This means that the future capital costs in the joint IIASA and WEC 
study might be smaller due to technological change compared with other studies that assume 
more static technological development. 
There are other reasons for a possible overestimate of actual capital requirements. All cases 
explicitly adopt a cost-optimal structure of the cnergy system. Reality might be different, espe- 
cially if the chronic lack of capital continues to trouble the developing world. Replacement of 
old vintages might be postponed, leading to lower capital requirements. However, if departures 
from the outlined investment trajectories are too great, they may lead to energy supply shortages 
and thus to a loss of economic output, which would then be lower than assumed in the three 
cases. 
On the other hand, the possibility of underestimation cannot be ruled out either. For example, 
it is difficult to accurately account for the long-term ratio of peak-to-base load capacity, and the 
peak capacity may be higher than anticipated in the three cases. Also, if natural gas supplies 
cannot be brought to the market place at the rate indicated, the relatively low capital intensive 
natural gas-fired electricity generation needs to be replaced by more capital intensive coal or 
hydropower plants, cumulative investments may turn out to be higher than calculated in the 
joint IIASA and WEC study. On the whole, capital requirements implied by the three cases can 
be considered to represent a realistic and a detailed account of the financing needs of these three 
alternative futures. 
3.3. ENERGY INVESTMENTS IN THE THREE CASES 
Looking first at the cumulative capital requirements from 1990 to 2020, Table 3 shows the range 
across the cases to be from US(1990)$13 to 20 trillion (1012). The developing region's share 
rises sharply from today's 25 to 30 percent to between 42 and 48 percent, and it becomes the 
largest energy capital investment market in all cases. Looking at energy investments as a share 
of regional GDP, the reforming countries rank the highest, diverting seven to ~ i n e  percent of 
the regional GDP to the energy sector. They will be burdened by slow initial economic growth; 
at the same time they will need to replace obsolete energy infrastructures, and it is likely to 
be extremely difficult to attract the needed capital to the energy sector. Developing countries 
invest three to four percent of GDP in the energy sector, and OECD region investments are 
the lowest at 0.8 to 1.1 percent of GDP. By and large, it takes a greater effort to build up an 
energy infrastructure than to expand and maintain an existing one. Finally, the bottom section 
Electricity sector Extraction, upgrading, 
transmission & distribution 
Figure 5: Breakdown of Global Cumulative Energy Sector Investments for Case B from 1990 
to 2020, in trillion ( lo i2)  US(1990)$. 
of Table 3 shows an upward trend for specific investments (US$ per unit primary energy) in all 
cases, even though future energy investments do not increase relative to GDP. 
To illustrate what goes into the cumulative capital requirements of Table 3, Figure 5 breaks 
down the different components for Case B. The figure shows that investment in electricity 
generation is dominated by the OECD, especially for the expansion of nuclear and coal-fired 
capacity. New renewable and hydropower investments are concentrated in developing regions. 
Given the current economic unattractiveness of most new renewables, this reflects substantial 
learning curve effects. Over US$250 billion (lo9) are invested in the development of a bio-fuel 
production infrastructure. The accepted view that oil and gas generally are profitable investment 
opportunities is reflected both by the volume and regional breakdown in the figure. 
From 2020 to 2050, capital requirements in Table 3 grow substantially in absolute terms, but still 
more slowly than GDP. This is true in all scenarios. It reflects, first, the shift from supply-side 
investments (included in Tabie 3) to end-use technology and infrastructure investments (not 
included in Table 3). Had we beer1 able to include the latter, we estimate it might have increased 
the numbers by 50 to 100 percent. Second, the declining share of GDP going to energy invest- 
ments reilects continued progress along technological learning curves throughout the energy 
system. Had these been excluded, the capital requirements of the electricity sector in the OECD 
region would have been eight to 15 percent higher for 1990 to 2020. In developing regions, 
the impact would have been greater, an increase of 25 to 40 percent, due to heavy investments 
in new renewables and hydropower. Finally, and most importantly, capital requirements grow 
slower than GDP because of the continuation of energy intensity improvements, characteristic 
for all three cases. 
3.4. OTHER ESTIMATES OF FINANCING REQUIREMENTS 
The figures in Table 3 are consistent with the estimates of Energy for Tomorrow's World (2). 
There, the estimated global capital requirement for 1990 to 2020 was US$30 trillion (1012). 
This included efficiency improvement-related investments of approximately US$7 trillion (1012) 
which are excluded here, but excluded learning curve effects in lowering future investments 
which are included here. Once both corrections are made, the figures are consistent. Energy for 
Tomorrow's World was also used as the basis for a simplified analysis by Hyman (8). Assuming 
an average capital cost of US$750 per kW of generating capacity, he calculated total 1990 
to 2020 investment requirements to be US$4.3 trillion (1012) for the electricity sector. For 
comparison, our detailed calculations estimate requirements to be 75 to 125 percent higher. 
Annual capital requirements for energy investments rise from a little less than US(1990)$400 
billion (lo9) in 1990, to US(1990)$500 to 750 billion (lo9) by 2020, and US(1990)$0.7 to 
1.2 trillion (1012) by 2050. A large share of this investment would probably need to be 
externally financed. Hyman (8) estimates that a third of the global capital spending based on 
Energy for Tomorrow's World (2) electricity needs would be externally financed. This implies 
that a large share of total energy investments would also need to come from international capital 
markets or development assistance. That compares with total funds transferred to developing 
countries in 1990 of about US$140 billion (lo9), to a total debt service for these countries 
of about US$150 billion (lo9), and to total official development assistance from the OECD 
countries of about US$50 billion (lo9) (14). 
As its title suggests, the WEC report on Firzanciizg Energy Development: The Challenges and 
Requirements of Developin,y Co~lntries (15) investigated the challenges facing energy financing 
in the developing countries. The approach pursued by that study complements the approach 
of this joint IIASA and WEC study in many respects. While the joint IIASA and WEC study 
made extensive use of formalized models to assure consistency between economic develop- 
ment, energy service demand, capacity buildup rates, resource development, and extraction 
grounded on detailed technology cost data, the WEC study on developing countries drew on the 
expertise of many individuals and institutions including international development banks. The 
study focused more on the institutional and policy aspects, financing mechanisms, regulation, 
foreign investment, the role of international development agencies, etc., and less on detailed 
calculations of energy investment requirements. The joint IIASA and WEC study accounted 
for the investment needs on a technology-by-technology basis separately for production, con- 
version, transmission and distribution. The specific investment costs are dynamic and account 
for learning curve and economies of scale effects. It should also be noted that the underlying 
energy development scenarios have not been harmonized between the two groups. Finally, the 
geographical and temporal scopes differ: the joint IIASA and WEC study includes the entire 
world up to the year 2050 in greater detail and to 2100 in outline, while the WEC study on 
developing countries considers the time period 1990 to 2020. 
One should note another fundamental difference when comparing the sets of investment re- 
quirements produced by the two groups. The WEC study on developing countries excludes 
investments for energy exports in  their estimates. The investment volumes reported are based 
Table 4: Cumulative Energy Investment Requirements in Developing Countries. Reproduced 
from the WEC report ( 1 5), 1990-2020, in trillion ( l 012) US( 1990)$. 
Sector Latin MENAa Sub-Saharan DCs South All DCs 
America Africa Pacific Asia 
Electric power 1 .lo-1.80 0.304.50 0.204.40 0.53-1.12 0.30-0.60 2.43-4.42 
oi lb  0.074.24 0.06-0.16 0.04-0.13 0.03-0.13 0.06-0.12 0.264.78 
Natural gas 0.03-0.07 0.064.08 .002-0.04 0.014.03 0.014.03 0.1 1-0.25 
Coal 0.01 -0.03 OC .003-0.03 0.03-0.07 0.01-0.05 0.05-0.18 
Biomass and 
renewables 0.064.40 0.01-0.06 0.034.17 0.08-0.41 0.054.19 0.23-1.23 
Total 1.27-2.54 0.434.80 0.28-0.77 0.68-1.76 0.43-0.99 3.08-6.86 
"MENA: Middle East and North Africa. 
blncludes refining. 
'No additional capacity required. 
Table 5: Cumulals Energy Investment Kequireme~its in Developing Countries Based on 
Cases A", B, and c b ,  1990-2020, in trillion (1012) US(1990)$. 
Sector Latin MENA" Sub-Saharan DCs South Centrally All DCs 
America Africa pacificd Asia Planned Asia 
Electric power 0.3 1-0.38 0.1 64.22 0.16-0.21 0.454.63 0.334.46 0.74-1.15 2.1 5-3.03 
Oile 0.494.71 0.85-1.42 0.24-0.43 0.1 1-0.24 0.02-0.04 0.264.38 1.97-3.22 
Natural gas 0.27-0.32 0.50-0.60 0.03-0.04 0.1 3-0.16 0.16-0.25 0.124.17 1.25-1.49 
Coal 0.034.04 of 0.11-0.33 0.04-0.04 0.104.12 0.44-0.79 0.72-1.32 
Biomass and 
renewables 0.03-0.06 .007-0.01 0.03-0.08 0.03-0.03 0.014.03 0.07-0.18 0.254.30 
Total 1.20-1.46 1.61-2.13 0.63-1.03 0.77-1.10 0.72-0.81 1.65-2.67 6.59-9.20 
"A1 scenario. 
'C 1 scenario. 
CMENA: Middle East and North Africa. 
d ~ a n g e  for coal and biomass is too small at the level of significance. 
eIncludes refining. 
f Investments are very low. 
on meeting developing countries' energy demand only. Also unclear is whether the volumes 
include the investments for the replacement of retired plants and equipment. In addition, no 
capacity cushions are factored into the estimates for upstream oil and gas investments. 
The longer time horizon of the joint IIASA and WEC study introduces a distinctly different 
investment profile than is found in the more static calculations of the WEC study on developing 
countries. Constructicl, time, for new power plants can be as long as a decade or more. 
Therefore, the construction starts of capacity additions scheduled to connect to the grid in  the 
early 2020s will take place during the 2010s. Consequently, the financing needs arise during 
that decade and are included in the 1990 to 2020 cumulative investment requirements. 
Table 4 summarizes the energy investment requirements in the developing countries for the 
period 1990 to 2020, reproduced from the WEC report (15); Table 5 summarizes investment 
requirements from the joint IIASA and WEC study. The agreement between the two studies is 
surprisingly high given the fundamentally different study approaches and underlying method- 
ologies. The first notable difference (see Tables 4 and 5 and Figure 6) concerns the total 
investment volume. The lower range of the joint IIASA and WEC study of US$6.6 trillion 
(1012) barely overlaps with the upper range of the other estimate of US$6.9 trillion (1012). The 
lower range estimates differ by a factor of two versus a factor of one and a half for the upper 
ranges. The sectoral breakdown reveals that the upstream investments in oil, natural gas and 
coal exceed those of the WEC study on developing countries by an order of magnitude. Elec- 
tric power development investments, however, agree reasonably well between the two studies. 
Here, the estimates of the WEC study on developing countries are somewhat higher, which can 
be attributed to the static specific investment costs used in the calculations. In addition, the 
share of hydropower in electricity generation is generally 50 percent higher than in the joint 
IIASA and WEC study. The rapid hydropower capacity expansion implies the utilization of 
fairly capital intensive hydro resources. In contrast, the joint IIASA and WEC scenarios indicate 
an intensification of thermal power generation based on natural gas. Natural gas turbines tend 
to be considerably less capital intensive than hydropower. In this context, it is important to note 
that in the joint IIASA and WEC study specific investment costs are different for domestically 
manufactured generating technologies and for technology imports. Conventional plant and 
equipment is assumed to be largely of domestic origin and thus carries a lower price tag than the 
comparable equipment in the OECD; the costs of more complex plants are essentially uniform 
across the regi~ns. 
The order of magnitude differences in the upstream sector investment volumes arise from the 
large net fossil exports from the DC's primarily to the OECD, as well as the construction of an 
elaborated natural gas infrastructure. By the year 2020, net exports range between 660 Mtoe and 
1050 Mtoe (the latter is approximately the 1990 volume), the bulk of which is Middle East oil 
exports. In addition, all developing regions accelerate oil and gas exploration over the coming 
30 years to meet growing domestic demand and to curb depletion of national income driven 
by oil imports. Several regions begin the development of capital-intensive nonconventional oil 
reserves after 2010. /2 considerable amount of capital is absorbed by the expansion of energy 
transmission and distribution infrastructures. 
3.5. ENERGY TAXES AND REGULATION 
The Case C scenarios deserve a special mention because of the regulatory measures (e.g., taxes) 
that they incorporate to accelerate energy intensity improvements and to limit carbon emissions; 
this does not mean that new energy taxes would not be needed in other cases, but in Case C 
they are imposed explicitly. This gradually increases the real cost (3: energy to consumers 
by approximately a factor of four between 1990 and 2050. Tax revenues from the OECD 
region are transferred to the developing countries, and revenues from developing countries are 
recycled internally. The transfer of resources to the South results in a reduction in econcr:iic 
growth in the North. However, the potential impact of energy taxes is much larger In the 
South. First, the capital infusion from the North is not enough to offset the higher real cost 
of energy. Second, the impact depends on how productively tax revenues can be used. Taken 
together, these effects cause the 1990 to 2020 economic growth rates in Case C to fall behind 
those in Case A. However, in the longer run (post 2050), the transfer of funds to the South 
leads to GDP growth rates in Case C that exceed those in Case A. In the end, Case C's GDP 
in the South approaches that of Case A and in any case is substantially higher than in the 
non-cooperative Case B. This hypothetical case illustrates that capital transfers from energy tax 
a a a 
Electricity Generation Upstream 
Figure 6: Cumulative Energy Sector Capital Requirements in Developing Countries for Case B, 
1990-2020, in trillion (1012) US(1990)$. 
revenues could be in principle used for easing capital shortages in the developing countries, but 
that it requires an unprecedented degree of international cooperation. The relationship between 
energy regulatory and tax policies and investment is an important issue for the future assessment 
of energy financing requirements. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
For all scenarios the capital requirements of the energy sector are extremely large, but not 
infeasible. The good news is that investment requirements are likely to expand at a slower 
pace than overall economic growth. But there are two pieces of bad news. First, the energy 
sector will have to raise an increasing fraction of its capital from the private sector, where it 
will face stiffer competition and return on investment criteria than it has in the past. Second, 
most of the investments that need to be made are in the developing countries, where current 
trends in the availability of both international development capital and private investment capital 
are not auspicious. The longer-term prospects of overall economic growth outpacing energy 
capital requirements are no reason for complacency. The most difficult investment challenge 
is usually the next power plant, pipeline or refinery. Unlike energy resource requirements 
where uncertainty and potential difficulties are of a longer-term nature, capital requirements and 
finance need to be addressed and dealt with now. Today's investment will shape the immediate 
future, as well as the long-term options. 
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APPENDIX: SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE THREE CASES 
Case A (High Growth) is characterized by enormous productivity increases and wealth. It is 
technology and resources intensive and presumes favorable geopolitics and free markets. High 
growth facilitates a more rapid turnover of capital stock and changes in economic structure, both 
of which spur efficiency improvements and technological progress. If Case A is extended all 
the way to 2 100, global average per capita income surpasses even the highest levels observed 
today and current distinctions between "developed" and "developing" regions become obsolete. 
Case A includes three scenarios addressing alternative key developments in energy supply. In 
the A 1 scenario, there is ample future availability of oil and gas resources. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the A2 scenario assumes oil and gas resources are more limited, resulting in a massive 
return to coal. Finally, in the A3 scenario rapid technological change in nuclear and renewable 
energy technologies results in a phaseout of fossil fuels for economic reasons rather than due to 
resource scarcity. This unfolding into three different development trajectories results in three 
scenarios with almost identical energy end-use patterns but different energy system structures. 
Case B (Middle Course), with a single scenario, is based on a more cautious approach regarding 
economic growth prospects, rates of technological change, and energy availability. In short, the 
scenario is perhaps best characterized by "modest dynamics" and derives its appeal primarily 
because it is "pragmatic." Overall, the Case B scenario is "reachable" without relying on drastic 
changes in current institutions, technologies, or current perception of availability of fossil fuel 
resources. The more modest energy use compared with Case A implies that scenario B can rely 
on fossil fuel resources to an extent that is commensurate with current estimates of ultimately 
recoverable oil and gas reserves. Energy supply and end-use patterns are also closer to the 
current situation for a longer period in Case B than in Cases A and C. Beyond 2020, however, 
the depletion of fossil resources without counterbalancing technological progress will force 
more dramatic changes in energy supply structures. Nonetheless, a transition away from fossil 
fuel use is feasible and manageable. In the very long-term, the changes become much more 
dramatic, and an orderly transition away from fossil fuel use is not only feasible but appears to 
be manageable in terms of energy sector and institutional adjustments extending toward the end 
of the 21st century. 
Case C (Ecologically Driven) presents challenging global perspectives. It is optimistic about 
technology and geopolitics, but it also assumes unprecedented and aggressive international 
cooperation focused explicitly on environmental protection. It builds on substantial resource 
transfers from North to South, spurring growth in the South that will lead to a significant re- 
duction in present economic disparities. In addition to stringent control of local and regional 
pollutants, a global regime to control the emissions of greenhouse gases is established. The goal 
is to reduce C 0 2  emission levels to 2 GtC by 2100, [corresponding to one-third of 1990 levels 
required to stabilize atmospheric concentrations (16)l. Ambitious policy measures accelerate 
energy efficiency improvements and develop and promote environmentally benign, decentral- 
ized energy technologies. One policy option considered for achieving this goal is a carbon tax 
that gradually increases to US$400 per tC in 2100. Case C describes a transition away from the 
current dominance of fossil fuels toward a dominance of renewable energy flows. The quality of 
the energy carriers delivered to end users is high in order to meet the environmental constraints 
so that renewable energy sources are transformed into electricity, liquid, and gaseous energy 
carriers. Nuclear energy is at a crossroads and this constitutes the main difference between the 
two Case C scenarios. 
